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Abstract— We reveal critical insights into prob-
lems of bias in state-of-the-art facial recognition
(FR) systems using a novel Balanced Faces In the
Wild (BFW) dataset: data balanced for gender and
ethnic groups. We show variations in the optimal
scoring threshold for face-pairs across different sub-
groups. Thus, the conventional approach of learn-
ing a global threshold for all pairs resulting in
performance gaps among subgroups. By learning
subgroup-specific thresholds, we not only mitigate
problems in performance gaps but also show a
notable boost in the overall performance. Further-
more, we do a human evaluation to measure the
bias in humans, which supports the hypothesis
that such a bias exists in human perception. For
the BFW database, source code, and more, visit
github.com/visionjo/facerec-bias-bfw
I. INTRODUCTION
As more of society becomes integrated with
machine learning (ML), bias, fairness, and the
formalization of ML standards are topics of high
interest [1], [4], [30]. One effect of the growing
dependency on technology is the increasing con-
cern regarding biased and unfair algorithms. For
instance, facial recognition (FR) systems can be
untrustworthy and racist in some cases [10], [24].
.
Typically, convolutional neural networks (CNNs)
are trained on faces identified by a detection
system. Specifically, for FR, the goal is to project
faces to an N-dimensional space with minimal
distances between samples of the same identity
and maximize the gap separating those that are
different. Thus, the overarching goal is to discrimi-
nate between subjects with face encodings. We can
deploy such a CNN to encode faces to compare
via a similarity score: genuine pair if the score is
high enough; and rejected as an imposter.
A fixed threshold acts as a decision boundary in
similarity score space. Thus, the face features in the
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Fig. 1: Balanced Faces In the Wild (BFW). The
average face of its different subsets: top-left: the
entire BFW; top-row per race; left-column: per
gender. The others represent the ethnicity and
gender of the race and gender, respectfully. Table II
defines the acronyms of subgroups.
same class must satisfy a criterion in the form of a
single value [8], [17], [28], [29]. However, a single,
global threshold is a crude measure that leads to
FR errors. Furthermore, the held-out set used to
determine the global threshold tends to share the
same distribution with test data, which makes the
results skewed in favor of specific demographics
that make up a majority in both sets. That skew,
the difference in the performance of an algorithm
of certain ethnic groups, is our definition of bias.
A key question is: is FR too biased, or not?
The adverse effects of a global threshold are
two-fold: (1) the mapping produced by a CNN is
nonuniform. Therefore, distances between pairs of
faces in different demographics vary in distribution
of similarity scores (Fig 3); (2) the evaluation set
is imbalanced as well. Particular demographics
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TABLE I: The proposed BFW compared to related datasets. BFW is exactly balanced across ID,
gender, and ethnicity (Table II). Compared with Demographic Pairs (DemogPairs), BFW provides more
samples per subject and subgroups per set. Also, BFW uses a single resource, VGG2. Racial Faces
in-the-Wild: (RFW), on the other hand, supports a different task (i.e., domain adaptation). Furthermore,
RFW focuses on race-distribution across of pairs, while not considering the distribution of identities.
Database Number of Balanced Labels
Name Source Data Faces IDs Subgroups ID Ethnicity Gender
DemogPairs [14] CASIA-W, VGG&VGG2 10,800 600 6 3 3 3
RFW [30] MS-Celeb-1M ≈80,000 ≈12,000 4 8 3 8
BFW (ours) VGG2 20,000 800 8 3 3 3
making up a majority of the population will
carry most weight on reported performance ratings.
Reported results skew away from common traits
to the underrepresented subgroups. Alas, demo-
graphics like gender, ethnicity, race, and age are
underrepresented in most public datasets.
Making matters more challenging is that race
and ethnicity are loosely defined. For example, the
US Census Bureau allows an individual to self-
identify race (https://www.census.gov). We define
it as a group of people having facial characteristics
similar to those found in a region. The result is
various types of biases in FR systems in favor of or
against particular demographics remain a question.
To address (2), the lack of a balanced data, we
introduce a new benchmark for FR, called BFW
(Table I, II). BFW serves as a platform to fairly
evaluate FR systems and enable demographic-
specific ratings to be reported. We use BFW to
gain a deeper understanding of the extent of bias
present in facial embeddings extracted from a state-
of-the-art (SOTA) CNN model. We then suggest
a mechanism to counter the biased feature space
to mitigate problems of bias with more balanced
performance ratings for different demographics,
while improving the overall accuracy. Specifically,
we propose using an adaptive threshold that varies
depending on the characteristics of detected facial
attributes (i.e., gender and ethnicity, Fig 1). We
show an increase in accuracy with a balanced
performance for different subgroups of people.
Similarly, we show the positive effect of adjusting
the similarity threshold based on the facial features
of matched faces. Thus, selective use of similarity
thresholds in current SOTA FR systems provides
more intuition in FR-based research, while provid-
ing a method easily adoptable in practice.
The contributions in this paper are as follows:
1) Built a balanced dataset as a proxy to mea-
sure verification performance per subgroup.
2) Analyzed an unwanted bias in scores of face
pairs while showing that optimal thresholds
determined per subgroup significantly boost
and balances performances.
3) Showed bias causes inconsistencies in rat-
ings across demographics– the typical use of
a global threshold unfavorable. We mitigate
the problem via adaptive thresholds.
4) Conducted human-evaluations to demon-
strate bias in human perception.1
II. BACKGROUND INFORMATION
A. Bias in ML
Although the community is excited about the
progress and the commercial value of ML, the
trust between the society and techniques will take
time to build due to the bias in algorithms. The
exact definitions and implications of bias tend to
vary between sources, as do its sources and types.
One common theme is the tendency of bias to
hinder performance ratings in ways that skew in
favor of a particular subpopulation. At a high-level,
bias can be introduced by humans [33], data and
label types [27], ML models [3], [15], and during
evaluation [26]. For instance, a vehicle-detection
model might miss cars if training set was mostly
trucks. In practice, many ML systems learn on
biased datasets, which could harm our society.
1NIH-certified, Protect Humans in Research, IRB 19-09-08.
TABLE II: Database stats and nomenclature, optimal thresholds (to), and accuracy scores. Header: Subgroup
definitions. Top-row: Statistics of BFW. Middle: Number of pairs for each partition. Bottom: Accuracy with a
global threshold tg, the optimal threshold to, and accuracy with to per subgroup. Specifically, tg=0.259±0.002 when
averaged across the five folds. Columns grouped by race and then further split by gender. Out of millions of pairs,
accuracy is inconsistent across subgroups. Furthermore, F tend to perform inferior to that of M for all but B.
Asian (A) Black (B) Indian (I) White (W)
Female (AF) Male (AM) BF BM IF IM WF WM Aggregated
# Faces 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 2,500 20,000
# Subjects 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 800
# Faces / Subject 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25 25
# Positive Pairs 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 30,000 240,000
# Negative Pairs 85,135 85,232 85,016 85,141 85,287 85,152 85,223 85,193 681,379
# Pairs (Total) 115,135 115,232 115016 115,141 115287 115,152 115,223 115193 921,379
Acc@tg 0.941 0.952 0.967 0.960 0.958 0.962 0.973 0.981 0.962 ±0.012
to 0.255 0.246 0.277 0.242 0.297 0.264 0.233 0.239 0.257±0.006
Acc@to 0.942 0.952 0.968 0.961 0.960 0.962 0.974 0.982 0.963 ± 0.012
B. Bias in FR
Problems of bias in FR have been driven by dif-
ferent motivations and have therefore been solved
by different means. To name a few: problems
of data augmentation [35], one-shot learning [9],
demographic parity and fairness with priority on
privacy [12], domain adaptation [30], differences
in face-based attributes across demographics [32],
and even exploratory data analysis [20]. Yin et
al. [35] proposed to augment the feature space
of underrepresented classes using other classes
with a diverse collection of samples to encourage
distributions of underrepresented classes to more
closely resemble that of the others. Similarly, [9]
formulated the imbalanced class as one-shot learn-
ing and trained a generative adversarial network
(GAN) to generate face features as a means of
augmenting class with as few as one sample. [12]
proposed Generative Adversarial Privacy and Fair-
ness (GAPF) to create fair representations of the
data in a quantifiable way, allowing for the finding
of a decorrelation scheme from the data without
access to its statistics. Wang et al. [32] defined
subgroups at a finer-level (i.e., Chinese, Japanese,
Korean) to determine the familiarity of faces across
these subgroups. Genders have also been used as
subgroups for work in bias, whether for efforts
of analysis and understanding of gender-based
face encodings [20]. Most recently, [30] proposed
adapting domains to bridge the gap between races
by knowledge transfer, which was supported by a
novel labeled data collection, RFW. The release of
RFW came after the completion of BFW. Although
similar in terms of demographics (i.e., Asian,
Black, Indian, and White), RFW uses faces from
MSCeleb [11] based on the assumption CASIA-
Face [34] and VGG2 [5] was used for training.
In contrast, our BFW samples from VGG2 and
assumes MSCeleb was the training set. As shown
in [30], MSCeleb is highly imbalanced, primarily
consisting of images of white individuals. For this,
we expect bias from data, for this is the training set.
Furthermore, our experiments allow for the parsing
of results based on gender demographics (i.e.,
although RFW does separate males and females
in each subgroup, no consideration for splits in
just gender or just races are incorporated into
the experimental design). Thus, RFW and BFW
are complementary, with both adding metadata on
demographics for subjects with faces in renowned,
large-scale FR datasets.
Most similar to our work are the recent efforts
in [7], [14], [18], [25]. A common factor of these
efforts are claims of insufficient data supply to
support studies on bias in FR, and the introduction
of new metadata on demographics for image sets
parsed out of existing collections. Specifically, [14]
curated a set of faces based on racial demographics
(i.e., Asian, Black, and White) called DemogPairs,
while [25] honed in on adults versus children
called Wild Child Celebrity (ITWCC). Like the
proposed BFW, both were built by sampling
existing databases, but with the addition of tags for
the respective subgroups of interest. Besides, the
additional data of BFW (i.e., added an additional
subgroup Indian (I), along with additional subjects
with more faces for all subgroups), we also further
split subgroups by gender. Furthermore, we focus
on the problem of facial verification and the
different levels of sensitivity in cosine similarity
scores per subgroup.
C. Human bias in ML
Bias is not unique to ML, as humans also sus-
ceptible to a perceived bias across demographics:
it exists across different races, genders, and even
ages [1], [6], [19], [21]. [32] showed machines
surpass human performance in classifying faces
as Japanese, Chinese, or Korean by nearly 150%.
Precisely, humans barely pass random with 38.89%
accuracy (i.e., 13 is random).
We expect human bias to skew results in favor
of their genders and races. For this, we measure the
human perception of faces across demographics
in a controlled experiment. In the end, the results
concur [32]– we too observed an overall average
below random (i.e., <50%). Furthermore, we
provide details on settings and counts on the
number of submissions per demographics while
analyzing per demographic.
III. THE BFW BENCHMARK AND DATASET
We now discuss the BFW dataset, and protocols
to evaluate ML-based FR. We conclude this section
by reviewing the human evaluation conducted as
part of this work, to detect bias in humans.
A. The data
Problems of bias in FR motivated the design of
BFW. The data evenly represent various subgroups
partitioned by demographics. Inspired by Demog-
Pairs [14], the specification of BFW follows in
suit. BFW includes additional subgroups (i.e., IF
and IM), an increase in the number subjects per
subgroup, and with many more pairs (Table II).
Compiling subject list. All subjects were sampled
from VGG2 [5]. Thus, unlike others that depend on
multiple sources, BFW has less potential conflicts
in train/test overlap for existing models. We used
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Fig. 2: Detection error trade-off (DET) curves.
Top-left: per gender. Top-right: per ethnicity. Bot-
tom: per subgroup (i.e., combined). A dashed lined
shows a difference by about 2× in FPR for the
same threshold θconst . FNR is the number of match
errors, so closer a curve is to the bottom better.
pre-trained ethnicity [2] and gender [16] classifiers
to find candidates for the different subgroups.
Detecting faces. Faces were detected using multi-
task CNN (MTCNN) [36].2 Then, assigned into
one of two sets. Faces within detected bounding
box (BB) regions extended out 130% in each
direction, with zero-padding as the boundary
condition made-up one set. The second set were
faces aligned and cropped for Sphereface [17] (see
the next step). Also, coordinates of the BB and the
five landmarks from MTCNN were stored as part
of the static, raw data. For samples with multiple
face detections, we used the BB area times the
confidence score of the MTCNN to determine the
face most likely to be the subject of interest, with
the others set aside and labeled miss-detection.
Validating labels. Faces of BFW were encoded
using the original implementation of the SOTA
Sphereface [17]: applying an affine transforma-
tion to align faces according to pre-defined eye
locations, each face fed through twice (i.e., the
2https://github.com/polarisZhao/mtcnn-pytorch
original and horizontally flipped), with the final
encoding obtained by fusing the two features
by average pooling (i.e., 512 D). A matrix of
cosine similarity scores was then generated for
each subject, and removed samples (i.e., rows)
with median scores below threshold θ = 0.2 (set
manually). Mathematically, the nth sample for the
jth subject with N j faces was removed if the
ordinal rank of its score n = P×N100 ≥ θ , where
P = 50. In other words, the median (i.e., 50
percentile) of all scores for a faces with respect
to all of faces for the respective subject must pass
a threshold of θ = 0.2; else, the face is dropped.
This allowed us to quickly prune false-positive (FP)
face detections. Following [22], [23], we built a
JAVA tool to visually validate the remaining faces.
For this, the faces were ordered by decreasing
confidence, with confidence set as the average
score, and then displayed as image icons on top
toggling buttons arranged as a grid in a sliding
pane window. Labeling then consisted of going
subject-by-subject and flagging faces of imposters.
Sampling faces and creating folds. We created
lists of pairs in five-folds with subjects split
evenly per subject and without overlap across folds.
Furthermore, balance in the number of faces per
was obtained by sampling twenty-five faces at
random from each. Next, we generated a list of all
face pairs per subject, resulting in ∑Ll=1∑
Kd
k=1
(Nk
2
)
positive pairs, where the number of faces of all
Kl subjects Nk = 25 for each of the L subgroups
(Table II). Next, we assigned subjects to a fold. To
preserve balance across folds, we sorted subjects
by the number of pairs and then started assigning
to alternating folds from the one with the most
samples. Note, this left no overlap in identity
between folds. Later, a negative set from samples
within the same subgroup randomly matched until
the count met that of the positive. Finally, we
doubled the total count with negative pairs from
across subgroups but in the same fold.
B. Problem formulation
Facial verification (FV) is the special case of the
two-class (i.e., boolean) classification. Hence, pairs
are labeled as the “same” or “different” genuine
pairs (i.e., match) or imposter (i.e., mismatch),
respectfully. This formulation (i.e., FV) is highly
practical for applications like access control, re-
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Fig. 3: Signal detection model (SDM) across
subgroups. The scores for imposters have medians
about 0.3 but with variation in upper percentiles,
while genuine pairs vary in both (e.g., AF has
more area of overlap). A varying threshold varying
across different subgroups yields a constant FPR.
identification, and surveillance. Typically, training
a separate model for each unique subjects is infea-
sible. Firstly, the computational costs compound
as the number of subjects increase. Secondly, such
a scheme would require model retraining each
time a new person is added. Instead, we train
models to encode facial images in a feature space
that captures the uniqueness of a face, to then
determine the outcome based on the output of a
scoring (or distance) function. Formally put:
fboolean(xi,x j) = d(xi,x j)≤ θ (1)
where fboolean is the matcher of the feature
vector x for the ith and jth sample [13].
Cosine similarity is used as the matcher in Eq 1
the closeness of ith and jth features, i.e., sl =
fi· f j
|| fi||2|| f j ||2 is the closeness of the l
th pair.
C. Human assessment
We evaluated human on face pairs focusing on
two racial groups: Chinese and Caucasians. To
focus on the experiment, we honed-in on two
groups, white Americans (W) and Chinese from
China (C). The purpose was to the minimize
variability by only analyzing the subsets of the
broader groups of whites and Asians.
Samples were collected by recruiting subjects
from multiple sources (e.g., social media, email
lists, and family/friends)– a total of 120 par-
ticipants were sampled at random from all the
submissions that were (1) complete and (2) from
a W or C participant. Specifically, there were 60
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0.08 0.12 2.88 0.40 0.32 0.08 0.32 0.12
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0.20 0.12 0.32 0.08 4.00 0.16 0.24 0.00
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Fig. 4: Confusion matrix. Percent error (Rank 1) for
all faces of BFW queried against all others. Notice errors
concentrate within a subgroup, consistent with the SDM
in Fig. 3 (i.e., AF show worst performance, and is mostly
confused with faces of the same demographic). This plot
is evidence that while race/ethnicity may be challenging
to define, the subgroups are meaningful.
W and 60 C, both with Male (M) and Female (F)
split evenly. A total of 50 face pairs of non-famous
“look-alikes” were collected from the internet, with
20 (WA) and 20 (C) pairs (male and female split
evenly). The other 10 pairs are of others (e.g.,
Hispanic/ Latino, Japanese, African). Survey was
created, distributed, and recorded via PaperForm.
IV. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
A single CNN was used as a means to control
the experiments. For this, Sphereface [17] trained
on CASIA-Web [34], and evaluated on Labeled
Faces in the Wild (LFW) [13] (%99.22 accuracy),
encoded all of the faces.3 As reported in [31],
LFW has about a 13%, 14%, 3%, and 70% ratio in
Asians, Blacks, Indians, and Whites, respectively;
furthermore, CASIA-Web is even more unbalanced
(again, as reported in [31]), with about 3%, 11%,
2%, and 85% for the same subgroups.
Additional CNN-based models demonstrate the
same phenomena: proportional to the overall model
performance, exact in which the ordering sub-
groups in sensitivity in scores space (Appendix a).
3https://github.com/clcarwin/sphereface_pytorch
TABLE III: TAR at intervals of FAR. For each
subgroup, and overall average FAR, listed are the TAR
scores for a global threshold (top) and the proposed
category-based threshold (bottom). Higher is better. The
proposed shows improvement in all cases.
FAR 0.3 0.1 0.01 0.001 0.0001
AF
0.990 0.867 0.516 0.470 0.465
1.000 0.882 0.524 0.478 0.474
AM
0.994 0.883 0.529 0.482 0.477
1.000 0.890 0.533 0.486 0.482
BF
0.991 0.870 0.524 0.479 0.473
1.000 0.879 0.530 0.484 0.480
BM
0.992 0.881 0.526 0.480 0.474
1.000 0.891 0.532 0.485 0.480
IF
0.996 0.881 0.532 0.486 0.481
1.000 0.884 0.534 0.488 0.484
IM
0.997 0.895 0.533 0.485 0.479
1.000 0.898 0.535 0.486 0.481
WF
0.988 0.878 0.517 0.469 0.464
1.000 0.894 0.526 0.478 0.474
WM
0.989 0.896 0.527 0.476 0.470
1.000 0.910 0.535 0.483 0.478
Avg.
0.992 0.881 0.526 0.478 0.474
1.000 0.891 0.531 0.483 0.479
A. Score analysis
Fig. 3 shows score distributions for faces of the
same (i.e., Genuine) and different (i.e., Imposter)
identity, with a subgroup per SDM plot. Notice
that score distributions for imposters tends to peak
about zero for all subgroups, and with minimal
deviation comparing modes of the different plots.
On the other hand, the score distribution of the
genuine pairs varies across subgroups in location
(i.e., score value) and spread (i.e., overall shape).
Asian Fem Fig. 4 shows the confusion matrix of
the subgroups. A vast majority of errors occurs in
intra-subgroup. It is interesting to note that while
the definition of each group based on ethnicity
and race may not be crisply defined, the confusion
matrix indicates that in practice the CNN finds that
the groups are effectively separate. The categories
are, therefore, meaningful in the context of FR.
B. Detection error trade-off (DET) analysis
DET curves averaged across 5-folds show per-
subgroup trade-offs (Fig. 2). Note that M perform
better than F, precisely as one would expect from
the tails of score-distributions for genuine pairs
(Fig. 3). AF and IF perform the worst.
The gender-based DET curve shows a difference
in performances between M and F with a fixed
threshold (dashed-line). Similar effects exist for
the other curves as well (lines omitted to declutter).
For many FR applications, systems are operated
at the highest FPR allowed, so the line of constant
threshold indicates that a single threshold produces
different operating points (i.e., FPR), which is un-
desirable. The difference in FPR is approximately
a factor of two– quite large indeed. If this is the
case in an industrial system, one would expect
a difference in about double the false positives
to be reported on based on subgroup alone. The
potential ramifications of such a bias should not be
overlooked, which it has not as of lately– gaining
interest of even main-stream media [10], [24].
C. Verification threshold
We seek to reduce the bias between subgroups.
Such that an operating point (i.e., FPR) is constant
across subgroups. To accomplish that, we used a
per subgroup threshold. In FV, we consider one
image as the query and all others as test. For this,
the ethnicity of the query image is assumed. We
can then examine the DET curves and pick the
best threshold per subgroup for a certain FPR.
We evaluated True Acceptance Rate (TAR)
for specific False Acceptance Rate (FAR) values.
As described in Section III-B, the verification
experiments were 5-fold, with no overlap in subject
ID between folds. Results reported are averaged
across folds in all cases and are shown in Table III.
For each subgroup, the TAR of using a global-
threshold is reported (upper row), as well as using
the optimal per subgroup threshold (lower row).
Even for lower FAR, there are notable improve-
ments, often of the order of 1%, which can be
challenging to achieve when FAR is near ≥90%.
More importantly, each subgroup has the desired
FPR, so that substantial differences in FPR will
remain unfounded. We further experimented using
ethnicity estimators and using the ethnicity of both
query and test image, which yielded similar results
to those reported here.
D. Human evaluation
Quantitative and qualitative results are in Ta-
ble IV and Fig. 5, respectfully. Subjects of a
subgroup likely have mostly been exposed to others
Fig. 5: Qualitative results of human assessment. X
for match; × for non-match. Accuracy scores shown as
bar plots. Humans are most successful at recognizing
their own subgroup, with a few exceptions (e.g., bottom).
of the same. Therefore, it is expected they would
be best at labeling their own; similar for the same
ethnicity, but other gender. Our findings concur.
Each subgroup is best at labeling their type, and
then second best at labeling the same ethnicity but
opposite sex. Interestingly, each group of images
is best tagged by the corresponding subgroup,
with the second-to-best having the same ethnicity
and opposite gender. On average, subgroups are
comparable at labeling images. Analogous to the
FR system, performance ratings differ when analyz-
ing within and across subgroups. In other words,
performance on BFW improved with subgroup-
specific thresholds. Similarly, humans tend to
better recognize individuals by facial cues of the
same or similar demographics. Put differently, as
the recognition performances drops with a global
threshold optimized for one subgroup and deployed
on another, human performance tends to drop when
across subgroups (i.e., most familiar with the same
subgroup; performance seems to drop when faced
with another, less familiar subgroup).
V. CONCLUSION
We introduce a new data set Balanced Faces In
the Wild (BFW) with eight subgroups balanced
across gender and ethnicity. With this, and upon
highlighting the challenges and shortcomings of
TABLE IV: Quantitative of human assessment.
Different human subgroups listed per row. Each column
is the subgroup labeled. Note that each people are
best within their subgroup, and second-best within the
same subgroup but different gender. CF shows the least
variation, but with the lowest accuracy. CM shows the
best accuracy, but second to WM in deviation from the
mean. Thus, scores for males vary more than females.
CF CM WF WM Avg
CF 0.529 0.480 0.438 0.447 0.474±0.041
CM 0.456 0.504 0.444 0.362 0.441±0.059
WF 0.447 0.438 0.573 0.480 0.485±0.062
WM 0.301 0.474 0.453 0.561 0.447±0.108
Avg 0.433 0.474 0.477 0.463 0.462±0.020
grouping subjects as a single subset, we provide
evidence that forming subgroups is meaningful,
as the FR algorithm rarely makes mistakes across
subgroups. We used an off-the-shelf Sphereface,
hypothesizing this SOTA CNN suffers from bias
because of the imbalanced train-set. Once estab-
lished that the results do suffer from problems of
bias, we observed that the same threshold across
ethnic and gender subgroups leads to differences in
the FPR up to a factor of two, which is seemingly
the cause of the frenzy about bias in FR in
main-stream media. Furthermore, we ameliorate
these differences with a per-subgroup threshold,
leveling out FPR, and achieving a higher TPR. We
hypothesized that most humans grown amongst
more than their own demographic and, therefore,
effectively learn from imbalanced datasets– a
human evaluation validated that humans are biased,
as most recognized their personal demographic
best. The focused research findings presented
here, along with the public database included, are
extendable in vast ways. Thus, we see this as the
slither to a much larger problem of bias in ML.
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A. OTHER CONVOLUTIONAL NEURAL NETWORK (CNN) MODELS.
Variations in optimal threshold exist across models (Fig. 6). Like in Fig. 2, the Detection error
trade-off (DET) curves for three CNN-based models, each trained on VGG2 with softmax but with
different backbones.4 Notice similar trends across subgroups and models, which is consistent with
Sphereface as well (Fig. 2). For example, the plots generated with Spherface and VggFace2 all have
the White-Male (WM) curve at the bottom (i.e., best) and Asian-Female (AF) on top (i.e., worst).
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Fig. 6: DET curves for different CNN models. false-negative rate (FNR) (%) (vertical) vs false-positive
rate (FPR) (log-scale) (horizontal) for VGG2 [1] models with different backbones (VGG16, Resnet50,
SEnet50). Lower is better. For each plot, WM is the best performing curve, AF is the worst. The the
ordering of the curves is roughly the same for each backbone.
Sample faces per subgroup of the Balanced Faces In the Wild (BFW) dataset are shown in Fig. 7.
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Fig. 7: Sample of BFW. Each row depicts a different gender, Female (F) (top) and Male (M) (bottom).
Columns are grouped by ethnicity (i.e., Asian (A), Black (B), Indian (I), and White (W), respectfully).
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